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Two decades after the launch of the euro and one decade into the inception of the crisis in
the Eurozone, the European project is subject to profound challenges, itself partly a symp-
tom of the social tensions that were generated by that crisis (Hall, 2018). A large body of
literature has sought to tackle the causes of the crisis in the Eurozone, but no consensus has
emerged. Answers to the question of what type of crisis this was vary from a crisis of
sovereign debt and fiscal profligacy, to a twin-deficit-crisis, a balance of payment crisis, a
crisis of the euro, a crisis of financialization, a crisis related to different ‘varieties’ of cap-
italism, and a crisis of capitalism itself. Most interpretations in economics – orthodox and
heterodox alike – share a focus on macroeconomic imbalances – either in the public or the
private sector or both (European Central Bank, 2012; European Commission, 2010;
Cesaratto, 2014; Frenkel, 2012; Perez-Caldentey and Vernengo, 2012; Storm and
Naastepad, 2015). Reflecting this focus, the literature in economics suffers from an under
appreciation of the role of politics in shaping the evolution of the crisis (Copelovitch et al.,
2016). Notwithstanding the crucial differences between mainstream and heterodox interpre-
tations, most of them neglect or attribute only a secondary importance to political agency as
a constitutive factor in the crisis.
Addressing this gap, this article draws attention to political agency, power and crisis
management. It focuses on the manifestations of the eurozone crisis in the still understudied
case of Portugal. While Portugal’s economic articulation within the Eurozone (and the
world economy overall) informed the way in which the country was initially hit by the
crisis, the strategies for crisis management also shaped the trajectory and anatomy of the
crisis. The global financial crisis reached Portugal in 2008, when Portuguese banks faced
increasing difficulty in accessing finance on international wholesales markets (Bank of
Portugal, 2009a; Lagoa et al., 2014: 102; Jurek and Marszalek, 2014: 21). A first phase of
crisis management witnessed the implementation of anti-cyclical policies and a series of
measures vis-à-vis the banking system (Ministerio das Finanças e Administraç~ao Publica,
2009; Torres, 2009: 60–61). These were always in line with guidelines at the European level,
including those from the Council of the European Union, the European Commission (EC),
ECOFIN and the Eurogroup meetings (Council of the European Union, 2008: 2; European
Commission, 2008, 2014; Ministerio das Finanças e Administraç~ao Publica, 2009: 21). In
March 2010, when the EC started insisting on ‘improved fiscal discipline,’ Portugal switched
to fiscal consolidation and internal devaluation (Costa and Castro-Caldas, 2014: 94).
Portuguese authorities passed three austerity programmes that are referred to as the
Stability and Growth Programs (SGP1-3) and were thereafter compelled to request a bailout
from the Troika of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), EC and European Central
Bank (ECB) in 2011. The structural adjustment programme that it was conditional on
deepened austerity and internal devaluation and opened the door for an unprecedented
neoliberal restructuring (Costa and Castro-Caldas, 2014; Hespanha et al., 2014). After a
recovery with almost 2% growth in 2010, Portugal fell back into recession in 2011 (World
Bank, 2018), thus lending support to the widespread argument that austerity aggravated the
recession (Constâncio, quoted in Jones, 2018).
Contrary to the widespread idea that the rescue packages in the European periphery were
imposed from the outside, the literature on Portugal acknowledges that series of domestic
players actively promoted the bailout. These included political parties, the banking system
and domestic scholars (Lains, 2013; Louç~a and Mortágua, 2012; Moury and Standring,
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2017; Rodrigues and Reis, 2012). Indeed, the bailout was announced amid a political crisis,
after a strong pressure from the country’s domestic banks, without any discussion in par-
liament and without the consent of the prime minister. The Socialist Party was effectively
squeezed out of government when the opposition parties voted down a fourth fiscal con-
solidation package, SGP-4. After the snap elections in June 2011, ‘going beyond the Troika’
was a mantra throughout the right-wing coalition government composed by the Social
Democratic Party (PSD) and the Social and Democratic Centre – People’s Party (CDS-
PP) in charge of implementing the structural adjustment programme between 2011 and 2014
(Lima, 2015: 10).
The contribution of this article is to document and analyse the agency of a series of
institutions within the world of finance, both within and beyond Portugal, in the run-up to
the bailout. It does so with reference to the debates about the relationship between structure
and agency and forms of power (Hay, 2002; Miliband, 1969; Poulantzas, 1969). While the
literature on Portugal has already pointed out that the domestic banking system exercised an
enormous political pressure on the government prior to the bailout (Lains, 2013; Louç~a and
Mortágua, 2012; Pena, 2014), so far there is no complete interrogation of their agency. This
article assembles a detailed chronology of events based on reports in the Portuguese media
and the international financial press. The analysis is also informed by interviews with a
former president and a former senior advisor of the Portuguese Debt Management Office,
Instituto de Gest~ao de Tesouraria e do Credito Publico (IGCP) and with two academics.1
Reports and press releases published by the ECB, the Bank of Portugal and IGCP provided
corroborating evidence.
The article shows that there was a strong degree of concerted action between the
Portuguese banks, the Bank of Portugal and the ECB. While a range of social forces activity
pushed for the Portuguese government to request a bailout, these institutions had the power
to trigger it. In accounting for this, the article provides fresh empirical details into the
authoritarian character of governance in the Eurozone (Schneider and Sandbeck, 2019).
It simultaneously analyses the interaction between internal and external drivers of neoliberal
adjustment, which so far is left out of political economy studies of the crisis in Portugal. In
analysing the agency of these institutions, the article interrogates their interconnection
through the Eurosystem. While the euro is already at the heart of the debates about the
causes of the Eurozone crisis, it is often treated as a fixed exchange rate regime, which has
hampered competitiveness in the Eurozone’s periphery. In other approaches, the EMU has
a ‘flawed institutional design,’ which engendered the crisis. In the latter view, the insufficient
degree of integration is the root of the crisis. Contrasting with the institutional design view,
this article provides a materialist analysis of Portugal’s integration with the EMU. Informed
by a Marxist approach to economic integration it develops the notion of the EMU as
‘financial architecture’ that is historically specific. This architecture incorporates various
national and international institutions, including central banks, private banks, credit
rating agencies and the state. The architecture formed a structure that shaped the agency
of a series of players within finance. The article argues that Portugal’s specific form of
integration translated into forms of political agency that led to a bailout and that opened
the door to a neoliberal resolution of the crisis. Furthermore, it emphasizes that Portugal’s
financial architecture is not static, but dynamic and contingent on the ECB’s monetary
policies. In the context of the crisis, this conditioned the relationship between the
Portuguese state, the domestic banks and the ECB, which again informed the agency of
each one of these.
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The article is structured as follows. The first section reviews the competing interpretations
of the crisis in the Eurozone. The second section discusses the relationship between structure
and agency and forms of power with reference to finance. The fourth section shows how
Portugal’s financial architecture was transformed in the context of monetary integration.
The fifth section analyses how this architecture acquired new dynamics following the 2007–
2008 crisis, in response to the ECB’s monetary policies and establishes the concept of a
‘triangular circuit of finance,’ which spanned the Portuguese state, the domestic banks, and
the ECB. The sixth section accounts for the agency of the Portuguese banks, Bank of
Portugal and the ECB in the run-up to the bailout. It shows that their agency was condi-
tioned by the financial architecture associated with the EMU and the triangular circuit of
finance. The last section concludes the article.
The crisis in the Eurozone
The most repeated explanation of the crisis in the Eurozone focuses on fiscal profligacy and
national policy errors. Greece’s first Memorandum of Understanding highlighted that fiscal
targets had consistently been missed despite a ‘benign economic environment’ and main-
tained that this was owed to ‘systematic overspending, endemic tax evasion and persistently
overoptimistic tax projections’ (European Commission, 2010). In the Portuguese case, the
IMF acknowledged ‘impressive’ progress and ‘significant overperformance’ in 2007 (IMF,
2008: 16–18; IMF, 2010), but concluded that ‘Portugal’s fiscal situation remains weak’ and
that consolidation had to continue (IMF, 2008: 18; IMF, 2010: 27). It is this crisis diagnosis
that provided the theoretical rationale for austerity and for a deepening of European fiscal
integration through various post crisis treaties, which have tightened the European Union’s
(EU) grip on member states’ fiscal policy. However, as the crisis evolved and spread to
Eurozone countries with fiscal surpluses up until 2007 (Spain and Ireland), the private sector
figured with increasing prominence in mainstream accounts (Mavroudeas, 2015). In Ireland,
Spain and Portugal, the current account deficits had grown exponentially from the 1990s or
early 2000s, but it was not driven by the public sector. This begged for an explanation for
why private sector competitiveness had declined. Key to this was the development of unit
labour costs (ULCs), i.e. the relationship between labour costs and productivity. The argu-
ment was that crisis ridden countries had lost competitiveness due to wages rising faster than
productivity, and this translated into higher ULCs (European Central Bank, 2012: 6). In
policy terms, this diagnosis served as a justification for the strategy of internal devaluation,
which, in the absence of national currencies, sought to boost exports by squeezing nominal
wages.
The heterodoxy rejects the idea that fiscal profligacy is the root cause of the crisis in the
Eurozone and instead look to growing current account imbalances in the context of the euro
(Arestis and Sawyer, 2011; Cesaratto, 2014; Frenkel, 2012; Lapavitsas et al., 2012).2
Contrasting with methodologically nationalist interpretations, the heterodoxy emphasizes
the economic relations between the Eurozone’s core and its periphery, through trade and
finance. The imbalances resulted from the creation of the euro which led to the ‘ultimate
fixing in the nominal exchange rate between countries’ (Arestis et al., 2013: 24). Core
countries pursued an export-led growth strategy based on squeezing wages and keeping
inflation low in pursuit of competitiveness whilst the opposite happened in the periphery.
There, ULCs increased, and the net result was a real exchange appreciation which under-
mined competitiveness (Bellofiore et al., 2011; Cesaratto, 2014; Perez-Caldentey and
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Vernengo, 2012). In both post-Keynesian and Marxist approaches, the trade surpluses of
the core were channelled into the periphery though financial recycling, and this led to high
levels of private indebtedness.
More pertinent to the question of crisis management are those approaches in economics
that see the crisis in the Eurozone as a result of the EMU’s ‘imperfect institutional design’
(hereafter referred to as the ‘institutional design view’). The balance of payment view versus
the institutional design view is a distinct debate within post-Keynesian economics, but there
are nevertheless overlaps between the two positions (see, for example, Arestis and Sawyer,
2011; Arestis et al., 2013). The post-Keynesian institutional design view scrutinizes many of
the EMU’s features that contributed to generating the Eurozone crisis and to the failure to
resolve it. Implicit is that European integration is inherently desirable, that insufficient
integration helped to generate the crisis, and that the solution is to integrate deeper and
better. In a typical statement, Botta holds that (2012: 3–4) ‘The current eurozone crisis
seems to have been decisively aided by the original institutional setup of the eurozone
and its incomplete nature with respect to a fully developed federal union.’
The institutional design view stresses the tension between unified monetary policies and
the lack of mechanism for fiscal transfers in the EMU, which makes it different from the
USA. The EMU does not possess mechanisms for fiscal transfers between surplus and deficit
countries and is therefore not a fully integrated monetary area. De Grauwe (2010: 3) high-
lights that the EMU is not ‘embedded in a political union’ and that there is an ‘imbalance
between full centralization of monetary policy and the maintenance of almost all economic
policy instruments . . . at the national level.’ Cesaratto (2014: 17) recommends that the EMU
‘move in the American direction – by obliging members to have balanced budgets, federalize
existing debt, and creating a federal budget.’ In the context of the Eurozone crisis, it is held
that Greece should have received (bilateral) fiscal transfers from other member countries,
which could have reduced financial markets’ fear of sovereign default (De Grauwe, 2010).
The ECB is of central importance to the institutional design view. Arestis and Sawyer
(2011: 23–24, 27–28) criticize the EMU’s one-size-fits-all monetary policy, which contribut-
ed directly to the current account imbalances. Furthermore, the ECB is based on the prin-
ciple of central bank independence (CBI) where central banks cannot monetize governments
and where there is a complete separation between monetary policy and fiscal policy. Its
reliance on Northern American credit rating agencies, short of its own credit ratings, is
another problem. De Grauwe’s (2010: 1–3) holds that the Eurozone crisis started when
credit rating agencies went on a ‘frantic search’ for potential sovereign debt crises, and
‘sized upon Greece.’ Therefore, the ECB should stop relying on the outsourcing of risk
evaluation and instead do this internally. The main critique of the ECB, however, is that it
cannot, or does not take on the role of a lender of last resort (LOLR) vis-à-vis governments
(Arestis et al., 2013: 25; Lavoie, 2015). Its construction is based on the efficient-market-
hypothesis, which assumes that member states would not run into financial problems. When
this turned out to be untrue, the lack of a LOLR contributed to aggravating the financial
turmoil (Lavoie, 2015: 12, 16–17).
The institutional design view successfully identifies problems that fed directly into the
Eurozone crisis and into the failure to resolve it. Despite this, it does not go far enough in
capturing the EMU as a holistic entity that spans the national and the European level, that
integrates various institutions within the world of finance, and that is historically specific to
the internationalization of money under the euro. It analyses many separate problems with
the EMU, and it seeks to find technical fixes, but in doing so, it overestimates the degree of
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solidarity between Eurozone member states (Cohen, 2012), and fails to capture the class
dimensions of the European project, and of the monetary union in particular. It bypasses
the question of whether the EMU’s design in fact concentrates power and serves the purpose
of neoliberal restructuring rather than being a result of policy errors. An analysis that
captures the historical distinctiveness of the EMU should address how monetary and finan-
cial integration transformed the social relations of production within member states.
Contrasting with the post-Keynesian design view, the present article offers a Marxist anal-
ysis of monetary integration. It develops the notion of a ‘financial architecture’ rather than
an ‘institutional design.’ The argument developed here is that European monetary integra-
tion transformed Portugal’s financial system through changes in property relations, modes
of regulation, and the direction of financial flows, and that this amounted to a reconfigura-
tion of the country’s financial architecture. There were strong class elements to this process,
and this came to condition the political agency of institutions connected to finance capital
both within and beyond Portugal in the context of the crisis in the Eurozone.
Structure and agency, forms of power
Portugal’s financial architecture can be understood as a ‘structure’ that shaped the political
‘agency’ of financial actors at the peak of the Eurozone crisis. Structure may be broadly
defined as the ‘context . . . within which social, political and economic events occur and
acquire meaning,’ whereas agency can be taken to mean ‘the ability or capacity of an actor
to act consciously, and in so doing, to attempt to realize his or her intentions’ (Hay, 2002:
94). The relative emphasis on structure versus agency has important implications in terms of
how power is understood. If structures determine agency, actors may, by implication be
rendered powerless. As stated by Connor (2011), ‘if social structures are to provide the
starting point for analysis and practice, there may be little justification for recognizing
the agency of individuals.’ The either-or position, where either structure or agency shapes
outcomes may have gone out of fashion. Indeed, Connor (2011) speaks of a ‘false dichot-
omy’ between structure and agency whilst Vadrot (2017) holds that the two are dialectically
co-constituted. An attempt to transcend this dualism is made by Jessop in the strategic-
relational approach, which sees the structure and agency as abstractions can be distin-
guished from one another at a theoretical level, but which are ‘interwoven’ in concrete
contexts (Hay, 2002). Las Heras (2018) nevertheless holds that in this approach ‘power is
meaningless because agency can always be “redefined” so that it is explained through struc-
tural determinations.’ Breaking with determinism, he insists that power relations are histor-
ically specific and connected to class, and he proposes to speak of ‘contingent action’ rather
than structural necessities. In the field of entrepreneurial research, Ng (2018) holds that
‘rules . . . constrain as much as they enable the entrepreneur to create, reproduce and modify
the rules of their embedded structure.’ Importantly, structures might be enablers and not
just constraints. In the context of the present argument, the ‘structure’ at hand is the EMU
as a ‘financial architecture’ and the flows of money that derive from the ECB’s monetary
policy. The actors discussed are the financial institutions that pressured the Portuguese
government to request a bailout (i.e. the domestic banks, the Bank of Portugal and the
ECB). The purpose is not to conclude whether either structure or agency caused the bailout,
but rather to interrogate the interconnection between the Eurosystem and the agency that
unfolded at these various levels of finance, including the extent to which the former repre-
sented constraints or offered opportunities.
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Closely related to the structure-agency debate is that on forms of power, particularly
structural and instrumental power. This goes back to the Miliband-Poulantzas debate,
which sought to advance hitherto underdeveloped Marxist theories of the state
(Miliband, 1969; Poulantzas, 1969). In The State in Capitalist Society, Miliband analyses
the concentration of power in the hands of giant corporations in advanced capitalist soci-
eties. His analysis of the state observes a close relationship between the holders of state
power and the agents of private economic power, which he refers to as the ‘ruling class’
(Miliband, 1969: 55). He stresses the joint class background of businessmen and those who
serve the state apparatus, the actual participation by members of the capitalist class in
government and in the state apparatus and the ‘personal ties’ between the two (Miliband,
1969: 59; Poulantzas, 1969: 72).3 This gives capital ‘instrumental’ power. Poulantzas (1969)
criticizes him for a failure to conceptualize capital and the state as abstract categories.
Instead, he understands capitalist classes and the state as objective structures and the
social relations between them as an objective system of regular connections in which
agents or people are, ‘in the words of Marx, “bearers”’ of such structures (Poulantzas,
1969: 70, italics in original). If there are overlaps of personnel between capital and the
state, this is not what matters the most – since, the state has its own ‘specific internal
unity,’ or logic, which unites its members. The state has ‘relative autonomy’ vis-à-vis the
various fractions of capital, and according to Poulantzas (1969: 72–74) this better equips it
to serve the interests of this class as a whole. These ideas lie at the origins of the notion of
structural power.
In the recent literature, including on the power of finance, instrumental power refers to
lobbying, campaign donations, the activities of organizations that represent businesses, and
business’ privileged access to policy makers. Structural power reflects the fact that firms are
‘the agents of economic activity in capitalist democracies’ and to the ‘financial sector’s
central position in the economy’ (Braun, 2018; Culpepper and Reinke, 2014). These are
fairly general ideas. More pertinent to the present argument, Braun (2018) has developed the
notion of infrastructural power, as a sub-type of structural power, to advance the analysis of
the contemporary politics of finance in the Eurozone. He argues that finance possesses
infrastructural power, which ‘stems from entanglements between specific financial markets
and public-sector actors, such as treasuries and central banks, that govern by transacting in
those markets’ (Braun, 2018). The concept is applied to analyse power in the realm of
monetary policy, which is exercised by public monetary authorities (i.e. central banks)
but relies on private financial markets for its implementation. The central argument is
that state actors generate ‘infrastructural entanglements’ when they transact in financial
markets and that this gives rise to a certain type of financial sector power. The two markets
under consideration are repo and securitization markets, key sectors of market-based bank-
ing through which the ECB implements monetary policy. The notion of entanglements is
central here, since it seeks to capture the nexus between the public and the private sphere,
and in doing so, breaks with the widespread notion of a dichotomy between the state and the
market and/or finance. Instead, the hybridity view states that ‘state and market actors form
a hybrid public–private partnership’, or a ‘franchise system.’ The approach recognizes that
state agency ‘is often market based’ in the sense that state actors are ‘not just regulators but
also participants in financial markets’ (Braun, 2018).
The present analysis has similarities with Braun’s notions of finance’s infrastructural
power and entanglements. A merit of the analysis is the way in which it captures the inter-
connectedness between state actors and financial markets. Not only banks, but states too are
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embedded in international financial markets.4 In capturing this, it overcomes Weberian
notions that see the state as emancipated from society. It also avoids assuming that state
actors are uniform (indeed much like Miliband, 1969). The present article looks at how
different actors in finance, including state actors, were materially entangled at the peak of
the sovereign debt crisis. There are also some differences from Braun’s argument, which
partly reflects the object of enquiry and research question at hand. While Braun (2018)
applies the concepts of infrastructure and infrastructural power to the repo and the securi-
tization markets, this article approaches the notion of a ‘financial architecture’ from the
vantage point of an EMU member country. It nevertheless seeks to go beyond the nation
state as a unit of analysis and to advance a class analysis. The notion of an architecture
incorporates a whole series of public and private financial actors: the ECB, the Bank of
Portugal, the IGCP, credit rating agencies, private banks and wholesale financial markets.
Given Portugal’s asymmetrical integration into the EMU, it must necessarily place a great
emphasis on the hierarchical nature of the Eurosystem. Finally, there is a difference with
regards to the type of agency that is sought explained. Braun (2018: 2–3) writes that ‘state
agency is often market based’ and that the ‘entanglement makes central bankers, who seek
to maximize their economic steering capacity, dependent on bankers, giving the latter infra-
structural power.’ This suggests a focus on agency in the general conduct of monetary
policy. In contrast, the present article investigates agency in the form of a deliberate attempt
to shape political outcomes, in the context of a ‘critical juncture’ (Braun, 2015).
Portugal’s financial architecture and the EMU
To advance a materialist analysis of Portugal’s historically specific financial architecture,
which constitutes the ‘structure’ at hand in the present analysis, it is useful to borrow from
Rom~ao’s (1982) and Poulantzas’ analyses of economic integration. Rom~ao’s (1982) distin-
guishes between ‘formal’ and ‘real’ integration. Formal integration refers to the legal-
political forms of integration and includes memberships in economic organizations
(Rom~ao, 1982: 1089). This may include the European Economic Community (EEC), EU
or EMU. Real integration, on the other hand, refers to the process of transnationalization
of capital. It concerns the forms of capital reproduction and accumulation across national
territories, which correspond to the needs of capital in a specific phase of capitalism. It
includes the sphere of production and the sphere of circulation – i.e. it may concern pro-
cesses such as the reorganization of production through foreign direct investments (FDI) or
global value chains just as much as the internationalization of money and finance. The latter
is arguably a defining feature of the present phase of capitalism. Real integration concerns
the material dimension of economic integration and it is constituted by a re-articulation of
social relations of production across national boundaries. Along these lines, Portugal’s
integration with Europe can be analysed in terms of the ‘the internal articulations of the
Portuguese economic structure and its insertion in the framework of international economic
relations’ (Rom~ao, 1982: 1087). This approach emphasizes class relations and seeks to
transcend the nation state as a unit of analysis.
Furthermore, economic integration can be an asymmetrical process whereby social for-
mations are unevenly integrated, and this manifests itself through power relations across
and within such social formations. Poulantzas’ (1978) work provides insights into this and
can add to the above insights on structural and infrastructural power. Analysing the rela-
tions of international domination that emerged in the aftermath of World War Two, he
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takes interest in the relations of domination within the metropolis itself, in the context of
North American investments in Europe. He defines a dominated social formation as one
where ‘the articulation of [the] specific economic, political and ideological structure
expresses constitutive and asymmetrical relationships with one or more other social forma-
tions which enjoy a position of state power over it’ (Poulantzas, 1978: 43–44). He counters
the view that domination and dependence play out as a conflict between ‘autonomous’ and
‘independent’ states and their national bourgeoisies. Instead, it inserts itself within the dom-
inated countries:
The [capitalist mode of production] no longer just dominates these formations from ‘outside’, by
reproducing the relation of dependence, but rather establishes its dominance directly within
them; the metropolitan mode of production reproduces itself, in a specific form, within the
dominated and dependent formations themselves. (Poulantzas, 1978: 46)
This takes place through a reorganization of the social relations of production within the
dominated formations. For Poulantzas (1978: 43–44), ‘[t]he organisation of class relation-
ships and state apparatuses . . . reproduces within it the structure of the relation of domi-
nation, and thus expresses . . . the forms of domination that characterise the class or classes
in power in the dominant social formation(s).’ That is, power is not primarily exercised by
one state over another but is instead internalized. His emphasis on ‘elite internalization’ can
add to contemporary Marxist interpretations of the EMU, which analyse the Eurozone’s
crisis management in terms of German dominance (Ryner, 2015: 284). His approach over-
comes methodological nationalism and gives primacy to class and the social relations. While
his emphasis was particularly but not exclusively on integration through FDI in
manufacturing, his ideas can be applied to analyse monetary integration. The EMU deep-
ened Portugal’s ‘real’ integration within the European project. If the dismantling of barriers
to trade was the first step towards European integration, a deepening of economic integra-
tion through the sphere of finance, constituted a second stage (Ant~ao et al., 2009: 33).
Financial integration and monetary integration went hand in hand. The former took
place in the context of preparing for the Single Market and the EMU (Ant~ao et al., 2009;
Pinho, 1997). As argued by Santos et al. (2018), European integration played a central role
in reshaping Portugal’s financial sector.
Under European monetary integration, Portugal’s financial system is inserted into a
hierarchical international system – the Eurosystem. This architecture forms an entity that
is historically specific and constituted by material relationships and forms of governance
and regulation. Portugal’s ‘financial architecture’ incorporates various institutions within
the world of finance, and it spans the Portuguese and the European level, as illustrated in
Figure 1. It comprises entities that are domestic (the Bank of Portugal, IGCP and
Portuguese banks), institutions from the EMU level (the ECB), and international entities
that are not strictly speaking European (international credit rating agencies and interna-
tional wholesales financial markets). This architecture is different from Portugal’s former
financial architecture. When Portugal entered the EEC in 1986, the financial architecture
inherited from the Carnation Revolution was largely intact (Pinho, 1997: 3). That archi-
tecture was characterized by state ownership of the banking system, central bank coordi-
nation of credit allocation and a series of mechanisms that channelled financial flows
towards the needs of the state, at a low cost (Noronha, 2013; Rodrigues et al., 2016:
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8).5 From the mid-1980s, it was profoundly transformed – indeed, it was dismantled
within a decade.
With the creation of the EMU, the Bank of Portugal became part of the European
System of Central Banks (Figure 1). There was a hierarchical element to it since it was
made subordinate to the ECB and monetary autonomy was lost. Capital movements were
liberalized from 1986 onwards (Ant~ao et al., 2009) and this opened the possibility for a
deeper ‘real’ integration through the sphere of finance. Lei Bancaria of 1992 introduced
many of the elements of the Single Market Programme Directives (Pinho, 1997: 15).
Portugal deregulated interest rates and adopted the First and Second European Banking
Directive in 1992 (Perez-Caldentey and Vernengo, 2012: 11). There was a shift in ownership,
since privatization was ‘important in showing the neoliberal commitment of the Portuguese
political elites to both a market-driven European integration,’ and since the income gener-
ated was used to comply with the Maastricht criteria (Rodrigues and Reis, 2012: 196). Three
constitutional revisions opened for a privatization of banking (Rosa, 2014). The first private
banks were set up in 1984 and 1985 and they ‘prospered’ (Ant~ao et al., 2009: 428). With the
implementation of the Second Banking Directive, barriers to entry for new banks were lifted
once and for all (Pinho, 1997: 4–5).
Financial liberalization also involved a qualitative shift in the public debt regime which
also forms part of Portugal’s financial architecture (Figure 1). The dismantling of the post-
Revolutionary financial system went hand in hand with a state-led effort to create a market
for public debt (Rodrigues et al., 2016). This came to reshape the interconnection, or the
‘entanglement’ between state actors and financial markets. From a mainstream perspective,
the Portuguese financial system was repressed. The reserve requirements and cheap financ-
ing of public debt represented a ‘distortion’ and an ‘implicit taxation’ on the banking system
(Ant~ao et al., 2009: 419). A Treasury bill market was set up in 1985, and this was ‘the
starting point for a public debt market’ (Ant~ao et al., 2009: 422). Its prominence grew
quickly, with the outstanding value increasing from 3.5% to 13% of GDP between 1985
and 1987 (Ant~ao et al., 2009: 422). As part of CBI, which was enshrined in the convergence
criteria (Arestis and Sawyer, 2011: 27), government monetary financing by the Bank of
Portugal was banned (Ant~ao et al., 2009: 26). The rates of compulsory reserves were reduced
Figure 1. Portugal’s architecture of finance under the EMU.
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from 17% to 2% of total deposits between 1989 and 1994 (Pinho, 1997: 13; Rodrigues et al.,
2016: 488) and with their subsequent release by the Bank of Portugal, an equivalent of 12%
of GDP were transferred to the banks in the form of public debt titles (Ant~ao et al., 2009:
427; Rodrigues et al., 2016: 9), thus benefiting the emerging finance capital. The liberaliza-
tion of interest rates opened the door for public debt to become a potentially profitable
asset. In the context of the EMU, the sovereign debt market was opened to foreign invest-
ors, paving the way for an internationalization of the creditors to the state. By 2008, 80% of
Portugal’s public debt was held by foreign creditors, thus it was heavily reliant on foreign
funding (Rodrigues et al., 2016: 494; Santos et al., 2018: 477). Finally, the creation of the
euro was accompanied by the attempt to create a single financial space and a vision of a pan-
European repo market was an important part of this. Sovereign debt played a central role.
The ECB used its collateral framework to ensure that all sovereign debt within the Eurozone
would face the same terms when used as collateral – facilitating the free movement of cash
and collateral across borders. The ‘Europeanization of sovereign collateral’ implied the
creation of a large amount of liquid collateral out of assets that had previously been illiquid
(Gabor and Ban, 2016). The ECB gave private credit rating agencies the task of evaluating
the collateral eligibility of sovereign debt in 2005 (Braun, 2018: 4), and thereby incorporated
them into the financial architecture. Portuguese sovereign debt is structurally connected to
wholesales financial markets through the repo markets, since government bonds are used as
collateral in most transactions (Gabor, 2016; Gabor and Ban, 2016). That is, the Portuguese
state is embedded in international financial markets (Figure 1). By the same token, it is also
inserted into a financial architecture that is historically specific to the internationalization of
money and finance. This forms part of the broader social relations which constitute
Portugal’s articulation within the European project.
A triangular circuit of finance: The ECB, the banks and the Portuguese
state
In addition to these historical particularities, the turbulence on international financial mar-
kets in 2008 and the ECB’s monetary policies brought about temporary dynamics to
Portugal’s financial architecture. These temporary dynamics formed part of the structure
that framed the agency of financial players in the run-up to the bailout. As banks in Portugal
and elsewhere in the Eurozone faced trouble accessing wholesales financial markets, the
ECB implemented a series of measures to channel liquidity into the banking system
(Rodrıguez and Carrasco, 2014: 9; Wolff, 2014). This acquired political importance in a
second stage of the crisis, when the Portuguese state was excluded from international finan-
cial markets. Several credit rating agencies downgraded Portuguese sovereign debt the
summer of 2010 (Freire and Santana-Pereira, 2012: 180) and after the rejection of SGP-4
(Fitch Ratings, 2011; Oakley et al., 2011). Bond yields rose and foreign investors increas-
ingly withdrew (Bank of Portugal, 2011: 11). In this context, the ECB’s monetary policies
came to condition the relationship between domestic banks, the Portuguese state and the
ECB itself. By the announcement of the rescue package, a ‘triangular circuit of finance’ had
emerged. This circuit involved the Portuguese banks, the state and the ECB. The ECB
channelled liquidity into Portuguese banks; the banks channelled liquidity into the state
through sovereign bond purchases; the state was dependent on the domestic banks for the
issuance of public debt; and sovereign debt was deposited as collateral at the ECB in
Stadheim 411
exchange for more liquidity. Thus, there was an alteration in the modality of articulation
and in the form of entanglement between various financial players, including the public and
private, at the peak of the crisis. This aspect of a financial architecture is not accounted for
by the institutional design view. By the spring of 2011, both the Portuguese state and the
banks were dependent on the ECB’s liquidity operations, and this informed the political
agency that unfolded.
The triangular circuit of finance was not simply a product of spontaneous market mech-
anisms. Instead it reflected the ECB’s crisis policies. As banks in the Eurozone faced prob-
lems accessing international wholesales markets, the ECB came to play an important role in
ensuring bank liquidity (Bank of Portugal, 2011; Wolff, 2014). The ECB initially refused to
intervene directly in government debt markets and assistance took the form of refinancing
operations (Gabor, 2014). With the ‘acute banking crisis,’ trillions of euros were pumped
into banks when the ECB extended its lending through the main refinancing operation
(MRO) and the launch of several programmes under the umbrella of long-term refinancing
operations (LTRO) from November 2008 onwards (Rodrıguez and Carrasco, 2014: 9;
Wolff, 2014). An increasingly significant share went to peripheral Eurozone countries,
including Portuguese banks (Wolff, 2014: 6–7).
The ECB’s monetary policies strongly incentivized banks’ purchase of sovereign debt.
Reflecting this was a ‘carry trade’ whereby Portuguese banks recycled ECB liquidity into
sovereign debt and deposited the latter as collateral at the ECB in exchange for more
liquidity (Bank of Portugal, 2011: 11). An essential part of the ECB’s monetary policy in
the context of the crisis was its collateral policy (Wolff, 2014). The main components of
collateral policy are the definition of which assets are eligible as collateral, which credit
rating is required for the assets to be used as collateral, and the size of the haircuts in
relation to the market value of the assets. The ECB allows a broad range of assets to be
applied as collateral (Gabor and Ban, 2016: 626; Pinho, 2015; Wolff, 2014: 4). This includes
several types of debt instruments (issued by central governments, central banks, other public
institutions, supranational institutions, credit institutions and corporations and asset backed
securities). For the evaluation of the creditworthiness of such assets, the ECB relies on the
risk evaluations of four credit rating agencies: S&P, Moody’s, Fitch and DBRS (European
Central Bank, 2016).
To facilitate a transfer of liquidity into European banks, the ECB made changes with
regards to the assets that qualified as collateral (Bank of Portugal, 2009b: 327; Wolff, 2014:
4). In October 2008, the minimum rating required for assets to be eligible collateral (except
ABS) was reduced from A- to BBB- (Bank of Portugal, 2009b: 333; De Grauwe, 2010: 2;
Wolff, 2014: 5). This included sovereign debt. When rating agencies progressively down-
graded peripheral sovereign debt, banks could nevertheless continue to use this as collateral
to access ECB liquidity. Given that the Eurosystem has a single framework for eligible
collateral (the ‘Single List’ as of 2007), the changes applied to MRO as well as LTRO
(Wolff, 2014), and Portuguese banks would have benefited regardless of which of the refi-
nancing programmes they made use of.
A further change to the collateral policies concerned the haircuts. This alteration made
sovereign debt a particularly attractive asset from the perspective of the banks. The ECB’s
acceptance of assets with a lower credit rating represented a higher degree of risk, and to
compensate for this, it applied larger haircuts. Consequently, less liquidity was allocated for
a given amount of assets. For example, uncovered bank bonds with a low credit rating saw
the haircuts increase from approximately 15% to almost 40% in 2010, whereas highly rated
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ABS saw an increase from approximately 5% to 16%. The haircuts applied to government
bonds, on the other hand, were only modified marginally. Until 2013, the haircut for highly
rated government debt with five to seven years maturity was 3%. For lower-rated govern-
ment bonds with the same maturity it was 5% until January 2011 and 8% thereafter, until
July 2013 (Gabor and Ban, 2016: 629; Wolff, 2014: 4–5).6 This meant that banks could
access more ECB liquidity if they deposited public debt as collateral than if they used other
assets. In fact, it was a strong incentive. Sovereign debt gave the banks access to more ECB
liquidity than other assets gave. Consequently, a carry trade developed whereby banks
profited enormously from the spread between the low rate charged by the ECB and the
high bond yields on public debt (Pinho, 2015).
Portuguese banks became increasingly dependent on financing from the ECB from 2008
onwards. The recourse to Eurosystem refinancing operations by Portuguese institutions
multiplied by almost six times between 2007 and 2008, when the average daily balance of
refinancing reached e3,888 million. It reached an historical high on 31 December when the
balance of resident institutions stood at e10,210 million. MROs were widely used, as the
ECB set a fixed interest rate on an unlimited amount of liquidity, but Portuguese banks took
use of LTRO too. Participation in MRO intensified significantly from October 2008, and the
average balance in this scheme increased to e1,005 million, up from e189 million in 2007.
For LTRO operations with three months’ maturity, the daily average balance of resident
institutions increased from e525 million in 2007 to e2,257 million in 2008 (Bank of Portugal,
2009b: 331–332). From the first half of 2010, there was again a sharp increase in the ECB
financing of Portuguese banks. The Portuguese banking system continued to be in expan-
sion between December 2009 and December 2010, and a main driver behind this was the
profitable enterprise whereby banks invested in public debt and recycled this at the ECB
(Bank of Portugal, 2011: 44). By 2011, after successive downgrades of the sovereign and
bank debt, and with the banks’ exclusion from wholesale financial markets, Portuguese
banks continued to rely on the ECB for liquidity (Bank of Portugal, 2011: 45, 63; Pinho,
2015).
The carry trade that developed became a phenomenon in various Eurozone countries,
including Spain, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Malta and Portugal (European
Systemic Risk Board, 2015: 73). The institutional design view has not taken on board the
extent to which this carry trade represented a shift in the Eurozone’s design. The phenom-
enon has mainly been analysed by mainstream economics, which speak of a ‘doom loop,’
‘feedback loop,’ ‘deadly embrace’ or a ‘diabolic loop’ between banks and the state (Erce,
2015; Farhi and Tirole, 2018). While these concepts capture the economic intimacy between
the state and finance, many studies neglect the ECB’s role. It is essential to note that the
relationship was in fact triangular, involving the ECB, and went beyond a ‘mutual embrace.’
It involved a shift in the modality of articulation of the Portuguese state and banks within
the EMU. It temporarily deepened Portugal’s real integration within the EMU, but more
importantly, it changed the form of integration and of entanglements. It represented an
alteration of the social structures and state structures within the Portuguese social formation
– thus it constituted an example of how domination plays out through an insertion within
the dominated formations (Poulantzas, 1978). At the peak of the Eurozone crisis there was a
temporary alteration in the financial architecture. The ECB was in the position to force the
Portuguese state into default, and this had strong implications for the political agency of
finance in the critical juncture of the spring 2011.
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The political agency of the ECB, Banco de Portugal and the domestic
banks
The role of finance in triggering the rescue package can best be understood with reference to
Portugal’s financial architecture and the triangular circuit of finance. These constituted a
structure that framed the agency of a series of financial players. At stake prior to the bailout
was the Portuguese state’s ability to issue public debt (Castro-Caldas, 2014). While the
banks were the first to be excluded from international financial markets, the state was
next in line. To roll over existing debt, it was dependent on selling Portuguese government
bonds (PGPs) and Treasury bills (T-bills). Facing repayments of over e9.5 billion between
April and June 2011 (Instituto de Gest~ao de Tesouraria e do Credito Publico, 2011: 2), the
inability to access open markets could in the worst case provoke a sovereign default.
Reflecting the articulation of the Portuguese financial system within the EMU, the political
agency among financial institutions spanned the Portuguese and the European level, and it
included Portugal’s domestic banks – as creditors to the state, the Bank of Portugal and the
ECB. There was a strong degree of coordination between these three levels, reflecting their
material interconnection in the context of the triangular circuit of finance.
On 1 April, the Portuguese Debt Management Office IGCP held a first debt auction since
the collapse of the government (Oakley and Wise, 2011). It was an ‘extraordinary’ auction,
which had not been pre-scheduled by the IGCP and the Ministry of Finance (Oakley and
Wise, 2011; Pinho, 2015; TVi, 2011). Portugal raised e1,645 billion through the sale of PGBs
with 15 months’ maturity at an average interest rate of 5.79% (Instituto de Gest~ao de
Tesouraria e do Credito Publico 2011a: 1; Oakley and Wise, 2011). Demand for the bonds
was 1.4 times higher than the amount on offer and it was described as a ‘success’ (Oakley and
Wise, 2011). The Ministry of Finance evaluated it positively considering the ‘politically and
economically difficult situation’ and said they would continue to issue public debt (TVi, 2011).
The day before this, on 31March, the PSD sent a letter to the prime minister and the president
to argue in favour of a bailout. On 1 April, the Bank of Portugal sent a letter to the same
recipients, with the same message, and it was signed by the governor (Moury and Standring,
2017: 668). This conscious action had a clear intention (Hay, 2002: 94) that was inherently
political, and this stands out as a contradiction with the principle of CBI.
On 4 April, the Bank of Portugal held a meeting with the most important domestic banks
in the country. The central bank governor, Carlos Costa, advised the CEOs of the banks
that ‘[y]ou cannot continue to finance [the emissions of Portuguese public debt]’ since ‘[t]he
risk is that the banks will go under, that is, the healthy part, whilst it is the Republic that
created the problems’ (Pena, 2014: 15). This statement alluded to the dominant narrative at
the time, that it was the fiscally profligate state that had caused the crisis, and that the banks
should be cautious, since a default by the state could lead to the failure of the banks. His
message was echoed by the Bank of Portugal’s Financial Stability Report of May 2011
which stated that ‘the banking system’s exposure [to sovereign debt] is not immune to
potential losses deriving from the negative assessments of financial markets players and
rating agencies and should be gradually reduced under the deleveraging process in the
financial system’ (Bank of Portugal, 2011: 11). Both recommended that domestic banks
reduce their exposure to Portuguese public debt, but while the report promoted a gradual
adjustment, the head of the central bank encouraged a more abrupt change in investment
behaviour. Without access to the markets, the state could default or be compelled to request
a bailout to avoid defaulting.
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Subsequently, the presidents of Portugal’s four most important banks appeared in the
national press and pledged for a bailout. A well-known reporter, Judite de Sousa, held a
series of TV interviews between 4 April 2011 and 7 April 2011 (Lains, 2013: 2). This included
the CEO of Millennium BCP, Carlos Santos Ferreira, BES’s CEO Ricardo Salgado,
Fernando Ulrich of BPI and Santander Totta’s CEO Nuno Amado. The bankers agreed
that Portugal had to request assistance (Castro-Caldas, 2014). The CEOs warned that the
banks could no longer continue to finance public debt and announced that there was no
alternative to a bailout (Ferreira, 2011a; Pena, 2014: 15). Carlos Santos Ferreira was the first
to proclaim it to be ‘indispensable that the country seeks a short-term loan’ (Tavares and
Bugge, 2011). He recommended that Portugal should urgently request assistance from the
European Stabilization Fund and the IMF, maintaining that a bridging loan of minimum
e10 billion was necessary. He held that ‘[w]ith the worsening of the economic situation, with
the interest rates reaching historical records, and with rating agencies successively lowering
the rating of the banks, it is imperative to listen to the key players of the Portuguese banking
sector’ (Ferreira, 2011a). Ricardo Salgado, the chairman of BES, defended the same posi-
tion (Ferreira, 2011b; TSF Rádio Notıcias, 2011) and said that ‘the banks are losing out’
because they are lending to the state, and that ‘they cannot concede any more credit under
the current circumstances’ (TSF Rádio Notıcias, 2011). The chairman said that the banks
had ‘always been at the market, helping the state-owned-firms and the state, but that due to
the worsening of the ratings, the banks have to reconsider their situation’ (TSF Rádio
Notıcias, 2011). Salgado insisted that Portugal should request interim assistance from
Brussels and repeated that this was ‘imperative’ in order to ‘neutralize’ the effects of the
rapid increase in interest rates and to ‘calm down’ the markets as well as the Portuguese
(Inácio, 2011; TSF Rádio Notıcias, 2011). The President of the Portuguese Banking
Association (APB), Antonio de Sousa, echoed this message. He made it clear that it was
‘urgent’ to ask for assistance from Europe, because the banks did ‘not have any more credit
to give’ (Agência Lusa, 2011). Portuguese finance capital was united in the message that the
country should seek a bailout.
The bailout was announced on 6 April following the second debt auction after the col-
lapse of the government. This was two days after the meeting between the domestic banks
and the Bank of Portugal and immediately after the banks’ CEOs appeared on TV. Unlike
the auction on 1 April, this was an auction of T-bills. Whilst bond auctions have a maturity
of above 18months and tend to be dominated by foreign investors, T-bills have shorter
maturities and tend to be dominated by domestic players (Moreira Rato, 2015). It was a
‘double auction’ of T-bills worth e1,005 million, e455 million of which had a twelve months
maturity and e550 of which had a six months maturity (Agência Lusa, 2011). The bills had
an interest rate of 5.9% and 5.1% respectively (Agência Lusa, 2011; Instituto de Gest~ao de
Tesouraria e do Credito Publico, 2011: 1). Only e100 million were purchased by foreign
creditors, and public entities and domestic banks bought the rest (Jorge, 2014: 22). Despite
the bankers’ pledge to stop buying Portuguese public debt, they stepped in and bought it
after all. The debt auction was nevertheless portrayed as a sign that Portugal was ‘outside of
the markets’ (Jorge, 2014: 22). Hours after the auction, the minister of finance, Fernando
Teixeira dos Santos, announced the bailout in an email to the business newspaper Journal de
Negocios. He did so without the prime minister’s consent:
The country was irresponsibly pushed into a very difficult situation on the financial markets.
Faced with this difficult situation, which could have been avoided, I understand it to be
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necessary to resort to the financing mechanisms that are available in the European framework.
(Agência Lusa, 2011; Garrido, 2011; Jorge, 2014: 22; Mundy, 2011)
This appeared like a rare exercise of instrumental power. While banks and corporations may
frequently contribute to political campaigns or try to affect government policy through
lobbying, it is indeed not often that they openly dictate a country’s political direction and
succeed in doing so. The immediate reaction from the representatives of productive capital
was to embrace the decision. The president of the employers’ association, the Confederation
of Portuguese Business (CIP), Antonio Saraiva held that ‘this was the inevitable outcome’
(Jornal de Negocios, 2011b). CIP mainly represents employers in manufacturing, but also in
commerce, services and construction. According to Saraiva, Portugal had reached the limit,
especially after ‘the banks had announced that they would not be available to continue
buying national public debt’ (Agência Lusa, 2011). The president of the Textile and
Clothing Association of Portugal (ATP), Jo~ao Costa, said already hours before the
announcement that ‘it seems that there is no other sustainable alternative left other than
external help’ (Malta, 2011). For the president of the Portuguese Tourism Confederation
(CTP), Jose Carlos Pinto Coelho ‘this was the only possible way’ (Agência Lusa, 2011). In
other words, there was consensus across finance and industrial capital. The agency of
finance capital triggered the bailout, but the representatives of manufacturing, services
and construction endorsed it.
While the above chronology of events points to financial institutions within Portugal –
notably the central bank and the domestic banks, as players that pushed for the bailout, the
political agency spanned all the way to the European level, reflecting Portugal’s financial
architecture. It is well known that the ECB pressured Ireland into a bailout in 2010 (Castro-
Caldas 2014). The Irish bailout came only months before the Portuguese, when the ECB
threatened to stop the liquidity going into Irish banks. Beyond media reports about various
forms of pressures vis-à-vis Irish ministers (Bardon, 2015; Telegraph, 2015), in 2014 it
became publicly known that the ECB sent a letter explicitly threatening to cut off the
provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance to the Irish banks if the government did not
immediately apply for a bailout and commit to ‘undertake decisive actions in the areas of
fiscal consolidation, structural reforms and financial sector restructuring’ (European Central
Bank, 2014; The Economist, 2015; Taylor, 2014). Notwithstanding the ECB’s commitment
to the principle of CBI (Draghi, 2018), the institution dictated the undertaking of neoliberal
policy reform in Ireland. The ECB has subsequently published the correspondence between
Jean-Claude Trichet and the Irish finance minister, and its role in provoking the Irish bail-
out is an undisputed fact (European Central Bank, 2014).
A number of statements by key players indicate that the ECB was a protagonist also in
the Portuguese case (Castro-Caldas, 2014), but in a more obscure way. Soon after the
bailout announcement, it emerged that the ECB, together with the Bank of Portugal,
played a role in coordinating the Portuguese banks. APB president Antonio de Sousa clar-
ified the position taken by the bankers when they declared that they would not continue to
purchase public debt. As a representative of Portuguese finance capital, he pointed his finger
at the ECB: ‘When it became clear that state financing needs implied more funding by
banks, banks said this could not be done because they had clear instructions from the
Bank of Portugal and ECB to do the opposite, to diminish their exposure and not increase
it’ (Castro-Caldas, 2014; Khalip, 2011; Publico, 2011). The cycle of financing between the
banks, the ECB and the Portuguese state could not continue any further, and according to
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De Sousa, it was the ECB and the Bank of Portugal that had made this decision: ‘Banks did
not want to create an additional problem for the state, but they have been warning that the
model could not keep working . . . In order to lend to the state, banks had to ask for money
from the ECB, and that triangulation mechanism has reached its limits according to the
ECB and the Bank of Portugal’ (Khalip, 2011).
When de Sousa was quoted in the Financial Times the following day, he explicitly placed
the responsibility for the bailout on the ECB rather than on Portuguese banks. According to
Financial Times, De Sousa said that the ECB pressed the country’s lenders to stop increasing
their use of its liquidity, ‘setting in train events that led Lisbon to ask for a bail-out’ (Wise
et al., 2011). His view of the causal mechanisms at work could not be clearer. The statement
can plausibly be interpreted as an acknowledgement that it was in fact the threats by the
bankers to stop financing the state that triggered the bailout. Furthermore, De Sousa said
that the ‘message from the ECB and Portugal’s central bank not to expand their exposure to
ECB funding came a month ago,’ and that the ‘main reason for the banks’ heightened
exposure was linked to their financing of public sector and government debt.’ De Sousa
explained that ‘the instruction led them to conclude [that] they could not increase their
exposure to state debt.’ He noted that they ‘didn’t say that we couldn’t do x or y, but
they were very clear about the message’ (Wise et al., 2011).
The president of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet, fiercely denied De Sousa’s narrative, and
held that ‘We didn’t force the banks to do anything. We didn’t force the government or the
authorities in general . . . to do anything’ (Wise et al., 2011). Trichet’s denial may have
reflected the ECB’s fears of criticism after a political backlash after having forced Dublin
to accept a bailout the year before. After Trichet had spoken, the head of APB withdrew his
initial statements. De Sousa’s new position was that ‘there were no guidelines whatsoever
from the Bank of Portugal, nor from the ECB of course, in the sense that the Portuguese
banks should not continue acquiring national public debt’ (Castro-Caldas, 2014; Jornal de
Negocios, 2011a). This reflected a 180-degree turnaround with regards to his narrative about
the role of ECB and the Bank of Portugal in triggering the Portuguese bailout.
It is not clear exactly how urgent the Portuguese bailout was, or indeed if it was necessary
(Lains, 2015). There was always an alternative in the sense that the government could have
defaulted, which has been common across countries and throughout history (Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2008). Disregarding this option, there was a consensus in the international financial
press that the Portuguese state was able to honour its debt obligations in April, although
there was less certainty around debt maturing in June (Mundy, 2011). The Financial Times
(FT) immediate reaction to the bailout announcement was to publish an editorial piece titled
‘Banks 1 – Portugal 0’. It argued that ‘Another Eurozone country has been humbled by its
banks’ (Financial Times, 2011) and suggested that Portugal should have delayed the bailout
until after the elections in June. It held that ‘[u]ntil now, the government had appeared to be
holding its ground’ and that ‘Lisbon should have stuck to its position’ (Financial Times,
2011). The FT highlighted that Portugal could still afford to postpone a bailout and that the
interest rates were not unaffordable (Financial Times, 2011; cf. Lains, 2015).
Notwithstanding this, there can be little doubt that finance capital played an essential role
in triggering the Portuguese bailout and that their agency was intrinsically interconnected to
Portugal’s modality of articulation within the EMU and its form of entanglements. The
sovereign debt crisis itself reflected this architecture, since the issuance of public debt on
open financial markets acquired a new centrality in the historical context of monetary
integration. It was aggravated by the fact that the ECB could not or would not act as
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LOLR vis-à-vis governments. Concerning the agency behind the bailout, it appeared like the
Portuguese banks had the power to force the government to request a rescue package, but
this was a mere surface phenomenon. They did indeed exercise an unusual degree of ‘instru-
mental power,’ but the reason why this immediately shaped Portugal’s policy direction was
because of finance’s ‘structural power’ given the configuration of social relations that had
emerged at the peak of the crisis. To conclude that the power rested in the bankers’ hands
would be to ignore the structures in which they were operating. The ECB, the Bank of
Portugal and the domestic banks were all drivers of the bailout, and consequently of the
neoliberal adjustment. There was an intrinsic interconnection between their agency, and this
was a political expression of their material and regulatory interconnection through the
financial architecture and the triangular circuit. The latter constituted the ‘structure’ in
which they acted, a structure which equipped them with a peculiar form of structural
power. This power did not reflect the centrality of finance in the economy in general
terms, but something much more specific – namely the modality of their interconnection
at this moment in time. This should not lead to a determinist conclusion whereby the
structure provided by the Eurosystem determined their agency and the subsequent political
outcome. However, the monetary policies implemented in the ‘explosive’ phase of the crisis
(Braun, 2015) did generate a logic that favoured a coherent set of behaviours by multiple
actors whose agency provoked the bailout.
Drawing upon Rom~ao’s (1982) notion of ‘real’ integration, the triangular circuit repre-
sented a temporary alteration in the internal articulation of the Portuguese social structure
and its insertion within the EMU. This alteration was constituted by a shift in social
relations within Portugal, but the relations extended beyond national boundaries. The
ECB helped to bring about the doom loop, tightening the economic relationship of inter-
dependence between the Portuguese state and the banks, as creditors to the state. The two
were financially interlocked within the EMU, and the ECB was in a position to cut off bank
liquidity and to force the state into default. The agency of the banks, i.e. the pressure they
put on the government to request a bailout, reflected their material articulation within the
EMU, through the triangular circuit. The ECB had incentivized the banks’ investments in
public debt, but as the rating agencies downgraded Portuguese sovereign debt, the ECB
implemented larger and larger haircuts, reducing the liquidity to the banks (Pinho, 2015).
Only assistance could solve the problem of bank liquidity (Bank of Portugal, 2011: 63;
Moutinho, 2011). This was well captured in the Bank of Portugal’s Financial Stability
Report from May 2011:
In March the situation in Portugal registered a significant and rapid deterioration, in a context
of political instability. . . . The rating agencies successively downgraded their ratings on the
Portuguese state, as well as on the banks and several non-financial corporations. These develop-
ments heightened the pressures on the capacity to issue sovereign debt, as well as on Portuguese
banks’ access to financing from the international wholesale debt markets, given that these
downgrades had a negative effect on the valuation of assets eligible as collateral for credit
operations with the Eurosystem. (Bank of Portugal, 2011: 20)
Thus, the banks and the state faced a joint destiny. The credit rating assessments under-
mined bank liquidity and threatened the profitable carry trade as well as the banks’ ability to
act as creditors to the state. It can plausibly be suggested that the banks acted out of an
immediate interest in access to ECB financing. The Eurosystem’s collateral system made
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their pledge for a bailout rational from the perspective of liquidity and profitability. A
statement issued by the ECB on 7 July 2011, two weeks after the Memorandum of
Understanding was signed, confirms that this was the logic at work. The credit rating
agencies’ assessments would no longer serve as an obstacle to the provision of liquidity:
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has decided to suspend the appli-
cation of the minimum credit rating threshold in the collateral eligibility requirements for the
purposes of the Eurosystem’s credit operations in the case of marketable debt instruments issued
or guaranteed by the Portuguese government. This suspension will be maintained until further
notice. . . . The suspension applies to all outstanding and new marketable debt instruments
issued or guaranteed by the Portuguese government. (European Central Bank, 2011)
As soon as Portuguese authorities signed up to a neoliberal adjustment programme, aus-
terity and internal devaluation, the banks’ financing problems were solved. At this stage, the
ECB was not opaque with regards to its political intentions on Portugal’s behalf. Breaking
with the apolitical principle of CBI, the ECB made it clear that monetary policy decisions
were conditional on political reform:
The Portuguese government has approved an economic and financial adjustment programme,
which has been negotiated with the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB, and the
International Monetary Fund. The Governing Council has assessed the programme and con-
siders it to be appropriate. This positive assessment and the strong commitment of the
Portuguese government to fully implement the programme are the basis, also from a risk man-
agement perspective, for the suspension announced herewith. (European Central Bank, 2011)
Thus, these material relations represented a way in which domination inserted itself within a
dominated formation, though a reconfiguration of the class relations and the state appara-
tus (Poulantzas, 1978: 43–44). It was constituted by an asymmetrical economic relationship,
but differently from in Poulantzas’ analysis, the crucial cite of domination, at the peak of the
Eurozone crisis, was finance and not production. It penetrated the state and the banks.
Portugal’s political subordination at this critical juncture played out not as a conflict
between ‘autonomous’ states, but rather it established itself from within through specific
forms of monetary and financial integration. The material and regulatory relationships that
are part of the EMU translated into political agency that transcended national boundaries
and included various entities that are integrated into the financial architecture. Thus, against
the political implications of the institutional design view, which is fundamentally pro-
European, but which identifies flaws that can be fixed, there are material dimensions to
the monetary union that conditioned class agency across borders and favoured a neoliberal
restructuring, in the Portuguese case. This provided an opportunity for those social forces
that wished to see a neoliberal restructuring of Portuguese society – in this sense the struc-
ture did not necessarily represent a constraint. Instead, it was enabling. The ECB and the
Bank of Portugal acted in tandem and sent the same signal to the bankers, reflecting that the
Portuguese financial system extends beyond the nation state through the Bank of Portugal’s
subordination to the ECB. The banks acted according to the logic created by the ECB’s
collateral framework. At the peak of the sovereign debt crisis in Portugal, various levels of
finance capital were materially interlocked. Ultimately, this explains their agency and power
in the run up to the bailout.
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Conclusion
This article has advanced amaterialist analysis of monetary integration and its manifestations
at the peak of the sovereign debt crisis in Portugal. It has stressed the political agency of
finance and crisis management as factors that were constitutive of that crisis. The euro is
already at the heart of the debates about the crisis in the Eurozone. The present article has
added to the literature on the Eurozone’s imbalances and critically engaged with the literature
on the monetary union’s flawed institutional design. The institutional design view has iden-
tified problems with the EMU that fed into various failures to address the crisis once it
erupted. Yet, in the hope of finding institutional fixes to the Eurozone’s woes, it fails to
analyse how the EMU constitutes an entity which spans the national and European level,
and which informs political agency. Drawing on Marxist political economy, this article pro-
posed an alternative framework. It stressed that monetary integration was constituted by a
material reconfiguration of finance. In doing so, it constructed a historically specific analysis
of Portugal’s financial architecture. This architecture incorporates institutions within and
beyond Portugal, including the ECB, the Bank of Portugal, the Portuguese debt management
office, credit rating agencies and domestic banks. Furthermore, the article argued that the
financial architecture under the euro is not static. On the contrary, it acquired dynamics that
were specific to the moment of the crisis. As the ECB pumped liquidity into the Eurozone’s
banks, it simultaneously generated a triangular circuit of finance and an intimate relationship
of interdependence between the Portuguese state and the banks.
Against this theoretical and historical backdrop, the article provided an empirical answer
to the question of how Portuguese authorities were compelled to request a bailout from the
IMF, ECB and the EC in 2011. Based on reports in the Portuguese media and in the
international financial press, the article assembled a detailed chronology of events and an
overview of the political agency of a series of players within finance. The analysis was also
informed by material published by the ECB, the Bank of Portugal and the IGCP, and by a
selection of interviews. The article showed that the Portuguese banks pushed fiercely for the
bailout. In fact, they triggered it. Importantly however, the ECB and the Bank of Portugal
played a coordinating role. The synchronization between these three levels reflected the
triangular circuit of finance which resulted from the ECB’s monetary policies. The ECB
was in a position to cut off liquidity from both the banks and the state and to force the latter
into default, and this had important implications for the power dynamics at work. The
Portuguese rescue package created winners and losers, and amongst domestic elites and
capitalist classes, a series of actors wished to see an accelerated neoliberal restructuring.
For these actors, the crisis represented an opportunity for change.
In sum, European monetary integration entailed a set of material relations in which the
various levels of finance - the European and the national - were materially interlocked in
ways that allowed them to trigger a bailout, and consequently a neoliberal adjustment
programme. These insights should be taken into consideration in ongoing attempts to
rethink monetary policy in the Eurozone’s periphery. While the Portuguese case provides
an intricate story of how internal and European financial players interacted, similar dynam-
ics were at work in Ireland and in Greece. These cases illustrate the far from subtle ways in
which the ECB’ monetary policy can place constraints on national policy space. The ECB’s
ultra-easy monetary policies after the most explosive phase of the crisis have again altered
the dynamics of EMU member countries’ financial architecture. The pressure on sovereign
debt was generally alleviated and Eurozone banks’ overall exposure to public debt decreased
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(Allen, 2019). This article has not even begun to address this. Yet, given public debt man-
agement agencies’ continued embeddedness in wholesales financial markets, and given the
ECB’s reliance on the outsourcing of risk assessment to credit rating agencies, it seems likely
that similar dynamics could re-emerge in the future, short of these unprecedentedly loose
monetary policies.
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Notes
1. I am especially grateful to Pedro Lains for his generous insights, as well as to Eugenia Pires. I thank
Alfredo Saad Filho, Thomas Marois, Stathis Kouvelakis, Roberto Roccu, Engelbert Stockhammer,
Johnna Montgomerie, Sai Englert and Emiliano Perra for valuable feedback on previous drafts.
Finally, I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.
2. For a critique of the focus on ULCs across theoretical strands in economics, see Storm and
Naastepad (2015).
3. For an historical account of economic power and the networks that span capital and the state
in Portugal, seeCosta et al.’s (2010)OsDonos dePortugal. CemAnos dePoder Economico (1910–2010).
4. This has also been highlighted in the nascent literature on financialization of the state, which has
analysed public debt management agencies (see Fastenrath et al., 2017; Lagna, 2016).
5. This included credit controls, administrative interest rates and minimum reserve requirements
(Ant~ao et al., 2009; Pinho, 1997).
6. It should nevertheless be noted that the ECB changed its collateral schedule in January 2011, at a
critical moment, increasing the haircuts on government debt instruments rated from BBBþ and
below (Gabor and Ban, 2016).
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reflex~oes. Análise Social 18(72–74): 1087–1103.
Rosa E (2014) Grupos Economicos e o Desenvolvimento em Portugal no Contexto da Globalizaç~ao.
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